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Abstract
We present a mechanism for reservations of bursty resources that is
both truthful and robust. It consists of option contracts whose pric-
ing structure induces users to reveal the true likelihoods that they will
purchase a given resource. Users are also allowed to adjust their op-
tions as their likelihood changes. This scheme helps users save cost and
the providers to plan ahead so as to reduce the risk of under-utilization
and overbooking. The mechanism extracts revenue similar to that of a
monopoly provider practicing temporal pricing discrimination with a user
population whose preference distribution is known in advance.
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1 Introduction
A number of compute intensive applications often suffer from bursty usage pat-
terns [1, 3, 5, 6, 9], whereby the demand for IT, memory and bandwidth re-
sources can at times exceed the installed capacity within the organization. This
problem can be addressed by providers of IT services who satisfy this peak de-
mand for a given price, playing a role similar to utilities such as electricity or
natural gas.
The emergence of a utility form of IT provisioning creates in turn a number
of problems for both providers and customers due to the uncertain nature of
IT usage. On the provider side there is a need to design appropriate pricing
schemes to encourage the use of such IT services and to gain better estimates
of the usage pattern so as to enable effective statistical multiplexing. On the
customer side, there needs to be a simple way of figuring out how to anticipate
and hedge the need for uncertain demand as well as the costs that it will add
to the overall IT operations.
Recently, it was proposed to use swing options for pricing the reservation
of IT resources [3]. By purchasing a swing option the user pays an upfront
premium to acquire the right, but not the obligation, to use a resource as defined
in the option contract. As with the case with electricity, IT resources, such as
bandwidth and CPU time, are non-storable and with volatile usage pattern.
Thus, swing options provide flexibility in both the amount and the time period
for which a resource is purchased, making them appealing to users whose bursty
demand is hard to predict. From the point of view of the providers, if enough
users purchase these options providers can offset the cost of providing peak
capacity by multiplexing among many users.
Pricing a swing option for IT resources however, turns out to be difficult
because of the complexity of the option contract and the lack of a good model
of the spot market price, which at present is nonexistent. Moreover, there are
two important problems that need resolution. First, the user needs to be able to
estimate the amount of resources that need to be reserved as well as their cost;
and second, the provider needs to put in place a mechanism that will induce
truth revelation on the part of the user when stating the likelihood that a given
reservation or option will be exercised.
As was shown in [3], the first problem can be addressed by providing the
user with a simulation tool for estimating the cost of a reservation from a set
of historical data, as well as a provision for entering the user’s assumptions
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about aggressive or conservative swings. Because the prices for swings are set
ahead of time and not by market forces, the forecasting tool also provides a
powerful “what-if” capability to both the resource provider and the customer
for estimating outright costs and risks associated with fluctuations in customer
demand.
As to the provider’s problem with asymmetric information, it could be ar-
gued that a user’s historical usage pattern allows to predict his future demand.
But in many cases, such as with new users, the data may not be available or
reflect unanticipated user needs. Even worse, users may misrepresent the like-
lihood of their needs in order to gain a pricing advantage, with the consequent
loss to the provider. In the original design of the swing option this was addressed
by introducing a time dependent discount that induces early commitment to a
contract. But this strategy still allows users to misrepresent their likelihoods
the first time they buy an option.
This paper presents a solution to the truth revelation problem in reservations
by designing option contracts with a pricing structure that induces users to
reveal their true likelihoods that they will purchase a given resource. A user is
allowed to adjust his option later if his likelihood changes. Truthful revelation
helps the provider to plan ahead to reduce the risk of under-utilization and
overbooking, and also helps the users to save cost. In addition to its truthfulness
and robustness, the mechanism extracts revenue similar to that of a monopoly
provider monopoly provider practicing temporal pricing discrimination with a
user population whose preference distribution is known in advance [2, 4, 5, 7, 8,
9, 10].
We start by presenting a simple two period model in which at the first period
the user knows his probability of using the resource at the second period and
purchases a reservation whose price depends on that probability. A coordina-
tor then aggregates the reservations from all users and purchases the needed
resources from the provider. These resources are then purchased in the second
period. A nonlinear pricing scheme is shown to lead to both truthful revelation
and profitability to both users and coordinator.
We then extend the two period model to a multi period model which allows
the user’s likelihoods of use to change over time. In this more realistic scheme,
users are allowed adjust their options according to updated information about
their needs while remaining truthful at each time period.
Finally we show how this truth-telling reservation mechanism can be inter-
preted in terms of standard options terminology, and finish with a discussion of
3
the feasibility of this mechanism to provide revenues to both users and providers.
While the focus of this paper is on reservations for IT resources, there are
many other interesting situations where our mechanism can be useful. For ex-
ample, conference rooms in many organizations tend to be reserved in advance
in the likelihood that they will be needed for future meetings. The resulting
behavior leads to serious inefficiencies through reservations that are not exer-
cised and which force others to reschedule important meetings. A truth telling
mechanism like the one we propose would lead to a more efficient scheduling of
such conferences. Likewise, airline seats, hotel reservations, network bandwidth
and tickets for popular shows would benefit from a properly priced reservation
system, leading to both more predictable use and revenue generation.
2 The Two Period Model
Consider n users {1, 2, . . . , n} who live for two discrete periods. Each user may
need have to consume one unit of resource in period 2, which he can buy from
a resource provider either in period 1 at a discount price 1, or in period 2 at
a higher price C > 1. In period 1, each user i only knows the probability pi
that he will need the resource in the next period. It is not until period 2 that
he can be certain about his need (unless p = 0 or 1). We also assume that the
distributions of the users’ needs are independent.
Suppose all the users wish to pay the least while behaving in a risk-neutral
fashion. User i can either pay 1 in period 1, or wait until period 2 and pay C if
it turns out he has to, an event that happens with probability pi. Obviously, he
will use the former strategy when Cpi > 1 and the latter strategy when Cpi < 1,
while his cost is min(1, Cpi).
This optimal paying plan can be very costly for the user. For example, when
C = 5 and p = 0.1, the user always postpones the decision to buy until period
2, ending up paying 5 for every unit he needs.
In what follows we describe a reservation mechanism that allows him to pay
a small premium that guarantees his one unit of resource whenever he needs it in
period 2, at a price not much higher than the discount price 1. In addition, the
mechanism makes the user truthfully reveal his probability of using the resource
to the provider, who can then accurately anticipate user demand. At a later
stage, we show how this mechanism can be thought of as an option.
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2.1 The coordinator game
To better illustrate the benefit of this mechanism, we introduce a third agent,
the coordinator, who aggregates the users’ probabilities and makes a profit
while absorbing the users’ risk. He does so in a two period game, which we now
describe.
1. (Period 1) The coordinator asks each user to submit a probability qi, which
does not have to be the real probability pi that the user will need one unit
of resource in period 2.
2. (Period 1) The coordinator reserves
∑
qi units of resource from the re-
source provider (at the discount price), ready to be consumed in period
2.
3. (Period 2) The coordinator delivers the reserved resource units to users
who claim them. If the amount he reserved is not enough to satisfy the
demand, he buys more resource from the provider (at the higher unit price
C) to meet the demand.
4. (Period 2) User i pays


f(qi) if he needs one unit of resource,
g(qi) if he does not need it,
(1)
where f, g : [0, 1] → R+ are two functions whose forms will be specified
later.
These terms are completely transparent to everyone, before step 1.
For the coordinator to profit, the following two conditions have to be satis-
fied:
Condition A. The coordinator can make a profit by providing this service.
Condition B. Each user prefers to use the service provided by the coordinator,
rather than to deal with the resource provider directly.
The next two truth-telling conditions, although not absolutely necessary, are
useful for conditions A and B to hold.
Condition T1. (Step 1 truth-telling) Each user submits his true probability pi
in step 1, so that he expects to pay the least later in step 4.
5
Condition T2. (Step 3 truth-telling) In step 3, when a user does not need a
resource in period 2, he reports it to the coordinator.
From Condition T1. User i expects to pay
w(qi) ≡ pif(qi) + (1− pi)g(qi) (2)
in period 2. His optimal submission q∗i is determined by the first-order condition
w′(q∗i ) = pif
′(q∗i ) + (1− pi)g
′(q∗i ) = 0. (3)
Truth-telling requires that q∗i = pi, or
pif
′(pi) + (1− pi)g
′(pi) = 0. (4)
Condition T2 simply requires that
f(p) ≥ g(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
Now we study Condition A when all users submit their true probabilities
{pi}. Let U be the total resource usage of all users in period 2, and let W be
the their total payment. Both U and W are random variables. Clearly,
EU =
∑
pi, (6)
and
EW =
∑
w(pi). (7)
Lemma 1. If there exists an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0 such that
w(p) ≥ p+ ǫ for all p ∈ [0, 1], (8)
then
W − U →∞ a.s. as n→∞, (9)
i.e. by charging an arbitrarily small premium, the coordinator makes profit when
there are many users (Condition A).
Proof. This follows directly from the “X4-strong law”. (See e.g. David Willams,
Probability with Martingales, pp. 72–73, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
The random usage of each user does not have to be identically distributed.) 
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The small number ǫ is merely a technical device. In what follows we will
neglect it and use a weakened version of Eq. (8) as a sufficient condition of
Condition A (not rigorous):
w(p) ≥ p for all p ∈ [0, 1]. (10)
Last, Condition B says that the user can save money by using the coordina-
tor’s service:
w(p) ≤ min(1, Cp) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. (11)
To summarize, the following conditions on f and g are sufficient for the
truth-telling mechanism to work:
pf ′(p) + (1 − p)g′(p) = 0, (12)
f(p) ≥ g(p), (13)
p ≤ pf(p) + (1 − p)g(p) ≤ min(1, Cp), (14)
for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Consider the following choice1:
f ′(p) = −k(1− p), g′(p) = kp, (15)
which obviously satisfies Eq. (12). Letting p = 0 and 1 in Eq. (14) gives two
boundary conditions for f and g:
f(1) = 1, g(0) = 0. (16)
The solution for Eq. (15) and (16) is
f(p) = 1 +
k
2
− kp+
kp2
2
, (17)
g(p) =
kp2
2
. (18)
To check Eq. (13) and (14), we first calculate
w(p) =
(
1 +
k
2
)
p−
k
2
p2. (19)
And then it is not hard to show
Lemma 2. For the choice of f and g in Eq. (17) and (18), conditions (13) and
(14) are satisfied for k ∈ [1,min{2(C − 1), 2}].
1This choice is not unique, but is analytically simple.
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Figure 1: Plot of w(p) for C = 2 and k = 1.5. The red curve w(p) lies
completely in the region enclosed by the two blue curves.
Proof. Eq. (13) is satisfied because
f(p)− g(p) = 1 + k
(
1
2
− p
)
≥ 1−
k
2
≥ 0. (20)
To verify Eq. (14), we write
w(p) = p+
k
2
p(1− p) ≥ p, (21)
w(p) = 1− (1− p)
(
1−
k
2
p
)
≤ 1, (22)
w(p) ≤ Cp−
k
2
p2 ≤ Cp. (23)

Fig. 1 shows the special case C = 2 and k = 1.5. As can be seen, the red
curve w(p) lies completely between the two blue curves. The difference between
the upper blue curve and the red curve is the amount of money the user saves
(varying with different p). The difference between the red curve and the lower
blue line is the coordinator’s expected payoff from one user. Note that his payoff
is larger for values of p’s lying in the middle of the range, and is zero for p = 0
and p = 1. This result is hardly surprising, for when there is no uncertainty the
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Figure 2: Payment curves of the user for C = 2 and k = 1.5. If the user
needs one unit of resource in period 2, he pays according to the upper curve.
Otherwise he pays according to the lower curve.
user does not need a coordinator at all. Thus, the coordinator makes a profit
out of uncertainties in user behavior.
Fig. 2 plots the two payment curves, f(p) and g(p), for C = 2 and k = 1.5.
After signing a contract, a user agrees to pay later either the upper curve for
one unit of resource, or the lower curve for nothing. Note that f(p) is strictly
decreasing, a feature essential for the user to be truth-telling. A user with a high
p is more likely to pay the upper curve rather than the lower curve. Knowing
this, he has an incentive to submit a high probability of use and thus not to
cheat.
2.2 The reservation contract as an option
The contract discussed in previous sections can be equivalently regarded as an
“option”. Because g(p) is the minimal amount the user has to pay in any event,
we can ask him to pay it in period 1, and only to pay f(p)− g(p) in period 2 if
he needs one unit of resource at that time. Hence, by paying an amount g(p),
the user achieves the right but no the obligation to buy one unit of resource at
price f(p) − g(p) in period 2. Naturally, we may call g(p) the premium or the
9
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
PSfrag replacements
f(p)− g(p)
g(p)
Figure 3: Price-premium curve for the user. The horizontal axis is the premium
(value of contract, value of option). The vertical axis is the price the user pays
for one unit of resource in period 2.
price of option, and f(p)− g(p) the price of the resource.
Fig. 3 shows the parametric plot of resource price versus option price, for
p ∈ [0, 1]. Instead of submitting an explicit p, the user can equivalently choose
one point on this curve and pay accordingly. His probability p can then be
inferred from his choice (using Eq. (17) or (18)). This alternative method may
be more user-friendly because people tend to be more sensitive to monetary
values rather than probabilities. We can even further simplify the curve by
providing the user with a table with the values of a few discrete points along
the curve.
2.3 Possible extensions
Simple as it may seem, the two period model can already solve a wide range
of reservation problems. Here we show how the mechanism can be extended
to solve more nontrivial problems, as when there is uncertainty not only in the
consumption of one unit, but also in both the number of consumption units and
their consumption time.
Example 1. (Uncertain number of units) By checking past web statistics, a
company discovers that its website has the following pattern of visits: 90% of
the days it needs one unit of bandwidth, 6% of the days two units, 3% of the
days three units, only 1% of the days does it need four units of bandwidth.
Here the company faces a four-point distribution of usage rather than a two-
point distribution (either 1 or 0) discussed in the two period model. Imagine
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there are four units of resources: U1, U2, U3 and U4. The company’s usage
pattern can be written as P (U1) = 0.9, P (U1U2) = 0.06, P (U1U2U3) = 0.03,
and P (U1U2U3U4) = 0.01. Breaking down to individual unit, the pattern is
P (U1) = 1 (for sure one unit will be consumed), P (U2) = 0.1 (with probability
0.1 the company will need at least two units), P (U3) = 0.04, and P (U4) = 0.01.
Thus, to efficiently reserve bandwidth for some day in the future, the company
can reserve one unit for sure, and buy three options, all for the same day, with
p = 0.1, 0.04, and 0.01 respectively.
Example 2. (Uncertain consumption time) A biochemist will need for sure to
use a public supercomputer to run some CPU-heavy simulations next month, but
he has no idea on which day he will need it. He wants to reserve the supercom-
puter now to save cost.
Say that the next month has 30 days. The probability that he will need
the computer on one particular day next month is p = 1/30. He can buy 30
“p = 1/30” options, one for each day next month. For a numerical calculation,
assume that C > 2 and k = 2. His total expected cost would then be
30 g(
1
30
) + f(
1
30
)− g(
1
30
) = 2−
1
30
≈ 2, (24)
so he pays less than 2 for an uncertainty over 30 days, which is not bad.
Remark: The careful reader might notice that in Example 1, the Ui’s are no
longer independent, whereas in Example 2, the consumptions on two different
days are not independent either. This is not really a problem, because although
the options reserved by one user can be dependent, as long as the options
reserved by different users are independent, Lemma 1 still works.
3 A Multi Period Truth-Telling Reservation
In the previous 2-period mechanism, if a user learns more in time about the
likelihood of his needing the resource, it is impossible for him to modify the
original contract. To solve this issue we extend our mechanism so that the
user can both submit early for a larger discount and update his probability
afterwards to a more accurate one. We thus consider a dynamic extension of
the problem in which the user is allowed to change his probability of future use
some time after his initial submission.
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3.1 The information structure
Assume that everyone lives for three periods. In period 3 the user might need
to consume one unit of resource. He can either reserve one unit in period 1
at price 1, or in period 2 at a price C > 1, or buy it in period 3 at price
C2.2 The additional period 2 is introduced to exploit the user’s information
gaining process. In order to make this meaningful we need to carefully define
the information structure, especially what does “gain more information” mean.
Suppose that each user can end up in either state A or state B in period 2.
When in period 1, the user knows his probability of entering each of the two
states (A or B), but he does not know exactly which state he will enter until
after period 2. In this sense, we say that the user “gains” an extra bit of “state
information” in period 2. His probability of consuming one unit of resource in
period 3 actually depends on his state and will thus report a more accurate
probability once he gets the “state information”.
p21 1− p21
p22 1− p22
1 0
p1 1− p1
period 1
period 2
period 3
1 0
A B
Figure 4: The information structure for three periods.
This information structure is depicted in Fig. 4. The user enters state A
with probability p1 and state B with probability 1 − p1. If he enters state A,
with probability p21 he will need the resource in period 3. If he enters state
B, he will need the resource with probability p22. He knows these probabili-
ties (p1, p21, p22) at the beginning. Clearly, in period 1 when he has no state
information, his probability of needing the resource in period 3 is
p = p1p21 + (1− p1)p22. (25)
2The (1, C,C2) assumption is not essential. We could have assumed (1, C2, C3) instead
and the main result of this section will continue to hold, just that the maths would become
considerably messier.
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Example 3. On New Year’s day, a user is struggling against a paper deadline
due on Feb 1, which is for a conference to be held on Apr 1. With probability
0.7 he will finish the paper before the deadline, and there is 0.6 probability that
it will get accepted. If he cannot finish it before the deadline, he can still submit
a post-deadline paper, which will only be accepted with probability 0.2. He will
be informed whether his paper is accepted some time after his submission. He
is thinking of booking a plane ticket now.
The three periods are Jan 1, Feb 1 and Apr 1. The probabilities are p1 = 0.7,
p21 = 0.6, and p22 = 0.2.
Remark: We should distinguish between the concepts of error and uncertainty.
For example, by repeatedly tossing an unfair coin we can estimate its probability
more and more accurately, but even if we know its exact probability distribu-
tion we still do not know what the outcome would be for the next time. That
is, by maintaining a large history we can reduce error but not uncertainty. In
our information structure we assume that the user knows his accurate proba-
bilities (no error). In this context information is defined in the “uncertainty
elimination” sense, rather than in the “error elimination” sense.
3.2 The three period coordinator game
Again we describe a mechanism used by a coordinator to make profit by aggre-
gating the user’s uncertainty. A user may submit a probability in period 1, as
in the 2-period setting. Additionally, when he enters period 2 he is allowed to
update his probability based on his new information gained at that time. This
way the user can enjoy the full discount while simultaneously utiize maximum
information. His final payment in period 3 is determined by the one or two
probabilities he submitted. The whole mechanism is described more rigorously
as follows.
1. (Period 1) The user may submit a probability q1, which is suggested but
not obligatory to be the real probability p = p1p21 + (1 − p1)p22 that he
will need one unit of resource in period 3.
2. (Period 1) The coordinator reserves q1 units of resource from the resource
provider (at price 1).
3. (Period 2) The user may submit a probability q2, which is suggested but
not obligatory to be the real probability that he will need one unit of
13
resource in period 3, based on his information at this time (i.e. either p21
or p22).
4. (Period 2) The coordinator adjusts his holdings to match the new proba-
bility q2.
5. (Period 3) If the user claims the need of one unit of resource, the coordi-
nator delivers one reserved unit to him. If his reservation pool is not large
enough, he buys more resource from the provider (at the higher unit price
C2) to meet the demand.
6. (Period 3) The user pays according to Table 1:
q1 not q2 q2 not q1 both q1 and q2
uses one unit f1(q1) f2(q2) f1(q1)− αf2(q1) + αf2(q2)
does not use g1(q1) g2(q2) g1(q1)− αg2(q1) + αg2(q2)
Table 1: The user’s payment table. The columns represent his three possible
submission patterns.
In Table 1, (f1, g1) and (f2, g2) are two sets of 2-period truth-telling functions
solved in Section 2.1.
f1(p) = 1 +
k1
2
− k1p+
k1p
2
2
, (26)
g1(p) =
k1p
2
2
, (27)
f2(p) = C +
k2
2
− k2p+
k2p
2
2
, (28)
g2(p) =
k2p
2
2
, (29)
where k1 ∈ [1,min{2(C
2 − 1), 2}] and k2 ∈ [C,min{2(C
2 − C), 2C}]. To make
the mathematical analysis easier, we will choose k1 = k ∈ [1,min{2(C − 1), 2}]
and k2 = Ck ∈ [C,min{2(C
2 − C), 2C}], so that
f2(p) = Cf1(p), (30)
g2(p) = Cg1(p). (31)
We require that f2 > f1 and g2 > g1, so that the user pays more when he
reserves late.
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The third column of Table 1 needs special notice. The new parameter α > 0
is a “friction parameter” crucial for our mechanism to work. The expression
f1(q1) − αf2(q1) + αf2(q2) can be understood as follows. First, the user signs
a contract in period 1 and agrees to pay f1(q1) if he uses one unit of resource
later. Second, in period 2 the user can adjust his probability to q2 by “selling”
some of his old q1 contracts and “buying” some new q2 contracts. Because he
“sells” and “buys” in period 2, the selling and buying prices should be those
of period 2, namely the two f2 terms. We emphasize that in the contract form
solution described here, the user only signs one contract that takes care of two
periods and does not do any trading. However, there is an equivalent option
formulation in which the user does sell his options, which we describe in Section
3.3.
Intuitively, because f2 > f1, α has to be small enough since otherwise the
users would want to “buy” a lot of q1 contracts in period 1 and “sell” them
later in period 2. In fact, it can be shown that there exists a nonempty region
of α that allows the mechanism to work - that is, the user can save cost (even
more than using the 2-period mechanism) and the coordinator can still profit.
Formally, we have
Theorem 1. Suppose α ∈ (0, 1/C). The user’s optimal strategy is to submit a
probability in period 1 and to adjust it in period 2. Each probability he submits
is his true probability in that period. In addition, the coordinator is profitable.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 3, 4, 5, and 6 in the Appendix. 
3.3 Three period options
As for the 2-period problem, there is an equivalent “option” form of the 3-period
contract, which we now describe. Assume Eq. (30) and (31).
1. (Period 1) There are various options that the user can buy, with option
price g1(p) and resource price f1(p) − g1(p), for all p ∈ [0, 1]. The user
buys one share of q1-option at price g1(q1).
2. (Period 2) The user can swap αC (remember αC < 1) share of his q1-
option for a q2-option, by paying the difference price αC(g1(q2)− g1(q1)).
Then he holds a share (1−αC) of q1-options and a share αC of q2-options.
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3. (Period 3) If the user needs one unit of resource, he executes his op-
tions. That is, he pays (1−αC)(f1(q1)− g1(q1)) using his q1 option, plus
αC(f1(q2)− g1(q2)) using his q2 option.
It is easy to verify that this option payment plan is equivalent to Table 1.
Remarks:
1. In period 2 when the user swaps part of his option, he does this at no
additional cost.
2. In the plan discussed above all options are issued in period 1. There can
be new options issued in period 2 priced at g2(p), but then the user should not
be allowed to swap period-1 options for period-2 options. For example, this plan
does NOT work:
2.’ (Period 2) The user can swap a fraction α of his period-1 q1-option for
period-2 q2-option, by paying the difference price α(g2(q2)− g1(q1)).
The next plan does work, although a bit strange:
2.” (Period 2) The user can swap αC share of his period-1 q1-option for α share
of period-2 q2-option, by paying the difference price αg2(q2)− αCg1(q1).
3.4 Multi period options
The option form of the 3-period contract can be easily extrapolated to an m-
period contract (m > 3). Assume β is a positive number such that
β + · · ·+ βm−2 =
β − βm−1
1− β
< 1. (32)
Such a β certainly exists. For example 0 ≤ β ≤ 1/2 is enough for Eq. (32) to
hold for all m. The contract now says:
1. (Period 1) There are various options that the user can buy, with option
price g1(p) and resource price f1(p) − g1(p), for all p ∈ [0, 1]. The user
buys one share of q1-option at price g1(q1).
i. (Period i: i = 2, . . . ,m− 1) The user can swap βi−1 share of his q1-option
for a qi-option, by paying the difference price β
i−1(g1(qi)− g1(q1)).
m. (Period m) If the user needs one unit of resource, he executes his options.
That is, he pays
(
1−
β − βm−1
1− β
)
(f1(q1)− g1(q1)) +
m−1∑
i=2
βi−1(f1(qi)− g1(qi)). (33)
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4 Mechanism Behavior
We have seen that the truth-telling reservation mechanism helps the user save
money and the coordinator to make money, so they both have an incentive to use
it. An interesting question to ask now is whether the resource provider himself
would want to use the reservation mechanism, playing both roles of seller and
coordinator. To answer this question we need to consider objective functions
for both the user and the seller.
4.1 The user’s utility
In the previous sections we assumed that when it happens that the user needs
one unit of resource, he has no other choice but to buy it. In reality if the
on-spot price exceeds the user’s financial limit, he can always choose not to buy.
Because of this, the resource provider cannot set the price arbitrarily high.
Suppose the user has an expected utility in the form
u = v − c. (34)
Here, c is the minimum expected price he has to pay for one unit of resource,
estimated in period 1. v is the value of the unit to him in period 1, scaled
to v ∈ [0, 1] for simplicity. Equivalently, we can use period-2 value instead of
period-1 value and write
u = v2p− c. (35)
If the user does not buy the resource when he needs it, his utility is zero. We
again assume that the user is risk-neutral, so he maximizes his expected utility.
A user is completely described by his v and p.
4.2 The seller’s problem
4.2.1 Direct selling
Assume that it takes the resource provider constant cost to provide the resource,
so his profit-maximization problem becomes a revenue-maximization problem
(e.g., the cost of a flight is essentially independent of the number of passengers
on a plane). Without using the truth-telling reservation mechanism, he can only
choose a reservation price C1 and a spot price C2 to maximize his revenue.
To do so he must assume a prior distribution f(v, p) of the users, where
f(v, p) dvdp is the fraction of users whose (v, p) lie in the small rectangle (v, v+
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dv)× (p, p+dp). Suppose that he has complete information about the users, i.e,
he knows the real f(v, p). He then faces the following maximization problem3:
max
C1,C2
∫∫
dv dp f(v, p)I(v ≥ C1 ∧ C2p)C1 ∧C2p. (36)
Only those users with v ≥ C1∧C2p will buy resources from him, and he collects
C1 ∧ C2p from every such user. If C1 > C2 then C1 ∧ C2p = C2p, yielding
the same revenue as having C1 = C2. Thus without loss of generosity we can
assume C1 ≤ C2. Also, since no one will buy the resource in period 2 if C2 > 1,
the problem can be restricted to the case C2 ≤ 1. Hence the seller solves
max
0≤C1≤C2≤1
∫∫
dv dp f(v, p)I(v ≥ C1 ∧ C2p)C1 ∧C2p. (37)
In order to carry out an explicit calculation we need to assume a specific
form for f(v, p). A simple one is f(v, p) = 1, which implies that v and p are
both independent and uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. The seller’s revenue per
user is thus
R =
∫ 1
0
(1 − C1 ∧ C2p)C1 ∧ C2p dp
=
∫ C1/C2
0
(1 − C2p)C2p dp+
∫ 1
C1/C2
(1 − C1)C1 dp
= C1 − C
2
1 +
(
2
3
C31 −
1
2
C21
)
1
C2
. (38)
From this it is then not hard to check that the maximal revenue Rmax = 5/24
is achieved at C1 = 1/2 and C2 = 1.
4.2.2 Options
Within the truth-telling reservation framework, the seller sets two prices, f(p)
and g(p), by choosing the parameters C1, C2 and k. Note that C2 does not
appear explicitly in the prices, but only appears implicitly in the constraint
k ≤ 2(C2 − 1). Thus the seller can choose a sufficiently large C2.
4 In the
many-user limit, his optimization problem becomes
max
0≤C1≤1≤k≤2
∫∫
dv dp f(v, p)I(v ≥ w(C1, k, p))w(C1, k, p), (39)
3As in standard probability texts, here a ∧ b denotes the minimum of a and b, and I(·) is
the indicator function.
4This may seem surprising, but remember that the user never pays the on-spot price when
he buys an option! In fact, C2 can be set greater than 1 in this case.
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where
w(C1, k, p) = C1
[(
1 +
k
2
)
p−
k
2
p2
]
(40)
is the expected revenue he collects from a user whose expected value exceeds
the expected cost.
Again consider the special choice f(v, p) = 1. The seller’s revenue per person
is
R =
∫ 1
0
(1 − w(C1, k, p))w(C1, k, p) dp
=
C1
2
−
C21
3
+
C1k
12
−
C21k
12
−
C21k
2
120
. (41)
The related optimization problem is tedious but not hard in principle. It is
maximized at C1 = 5/8 and k = 2. The maximal revenue is again Rmax = 5/24,
equal to the maximum revenue of direct selling. While this is coincidental, as we
shall see in the next section, it does show that the two revenues are comparable.
4.3 Other distributions
We will now compare the two pricing schemes for other probability distributions.
Again assume that v and p are independent, and v is uniform on [0, 1]. Assume
now that p is uniformly distributed on [a, b], where 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1. In other
words, assume that
f(v, p) =


1
b− a
, a ≤ p ≤ b,
0, otherwise.
(42)
We optimize the seller’s revenue for the two schemes with multiple choices
of a and b. The numerical results are shown in Table 2. It can be seen that in
most cases the option mechanism performs better than the direct mechanism. In
particular when the users’ probabilities are concentrated at the small end (row
(0, 1/2), (0, 1/3) and (0, 1/5) in the table), the option mechanism significantly
beats direct selling. This is because in the direct selling scheme, the seller has
to compromise for a low C1 for small p, therefore losing considerable profit. On
the other hand, by selling options he can settle on a much higher C1 and profit
from the premium.
We thus conclude that the truth-telling mechanism is particularly efficient
for reservations of peak demands and rare events (small p).
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p direct selling options
(0, 1) 0.208 0.208
(0, 1/2) 0.167 0.197
(1/2, 1) 0.250 0.248
(0, 1/3) 0.130 0.183
(1/3, 2/3) 0.245 0.246
(2/3, 1) 0.250 0.250
(0, 1/5) 0.087 0.141
(2/5, 3/5) 0.248 0.249
(4/5, 1) 0.250 0.250
Table 2: The seller’s revenue per person, using direct selling or options. For
example, when the users’ p is uniformly distributed over (0, 1/2), the seller’s
revenue per person when using the option mechanism is 0.197.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a solution to the truth revelation problem in reserva-
tions by designing option contracts with a pricing structure that induces users
to reveal their true likelihoods that they will purchase a given resource. Truthful
revelation helps the provider to plan ahead to reduce the risk of under-utilization
and overbooking. In addition to its truthfulness and robustness, the scheme
can extract similar revenue to that of a monopoly provider who has accurate
information about the population’s probability distribution and uses temporal
discrimination pricing.
This mechanism can be applied to any resource that exhibits bursty usage,
from IT provisioning and network bandwidth, to conference rooms and airline
and hotel reservations, and solves an information asymmetry problem for the
provider that has traditionally led to inefficient over or under provision.
We first presented a simple two period model in which at the first period
the user knows his probability of using the resource at the second period and
purchases a reservation whose price depends on that probability. A coordina-
tor then aggregates the reservations from all users and purchases the needed
resources from the provider. These resources are then delivered in the second
period. In this case, we showed how a nonlinear pricing scheme leads to both
truthful revelation on the part of the users and profitability to both users and
providers.
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We then extended the two period model to a multi period model, thus al-
lowing for the user’s likelihoods of exercising the options to change over time.
In this more realistic scheme, users are allowed adjust their options according
to updated information about their needs while remaining truthful at each time
period.
Finally we showed how this truth-telling reservation mechanism can be inter-
preted in terms of standard options terminology, and concluded that in general
it performs better than direct selling, especially for peak-like demands.
This approach can be extended in a number of ways so as to become useful
in a number of realistic situations. With the addition of a simulation tool
developed in the context of swing options [3], for example, users can anticipate
their future needs for resources at given times and price them accordingly before
committing to a reservation contract. Yet another extension would allow for the
reservation of single units of a resource (airline seats or conference rooms, for
example) over a time interval, as opposed to a particular date.
Given the rather inefficient way through which most bursty resources are
now allocated, we believe that this mechanism will contribute to a more useful
and profitable way of allocating them to those who need them, while giving
the provider essential information on future demand that he can then use to
rationally plan its provisioning.
We thank Andrew Byde for valuable suggestions.
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Appendix
In this appendix we define δ = 1/C to simplify the expressions.
Lemma 3. If a user submits in period 1, it is weakly better for him to adjust
in period 2.
Proof. Consider a user who has arrived at period 2. He already submitted q1 in
period 1, and now can either adjust his probability to q2, or do nothing. If he
chooses to adjust, he will have to pay the adjustment fee in period 3, expected
to be
p2α[f2(q2)− f2(q1)] + (1 − p2)α[g2(q2)− g2(q1)], (43)
where p2 = p21 or p22 is his real probability of using the resource in period 3,
which he now knows. It can be easily checked that, no matter what he submitted
in period 1, it is always weakly better for his to adjust q1 to p2 (truth-telling).
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Letting q2 = p2 in Eq. (43), we have
p2α[f2(p2)− f2(q1)] + (1− p2)α[g2(p2)− g2(q1)]
= α{[p2f2(p2) + (1− p2)g2(p2)]− [p2f2(q1) + (1− p2)g2(q1)]}
≤ 0. (44)
The last step follows from Condition T1. 
Lemma 4. (Period 1 truth-telling) Suppose α < δ. If a user submits in period
1, he submits his real probability.
Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that the user will adjust his probability to p2
in period 2. As a result his expected cost is
c12 = pf1(q1) + (1− p)g1(q1) +
p1p21α[f2(p21)− f2(q1)] + p1(1− p21)α[g2(p21)− g2(q1)] +
(1− p1)p22α[f2(p22)− f2(q1)] + (1− p1)(1 − p22)α[g2(p22)− g2(q1)]
= p[f1(q1)− αf2(q1)] + (1− p)[g1(q1)− αg2(q1)] + function(p1, p21, p22)
= (1− αC)[pf1(q1) + (1− p)g1(q1)] + function(p1, p21, p22) (45)
Here the notation c12 means the user submits both in period 1 and 2. By
assumption 1 − αC > 0. Because (f1, g1) is truth-telling, the last equation
is minimized when q1 = p. Thus, if the user submits a likelihood, he better
submit p, the true probability (estimated in period 1) that he will use one unit
of resource in period 3. 
Note that, for the special choice f2 = Cf1, when the user submits two
probabilities and uses the resource, his payment can be written as
f1(q1)− αf2(q1) + αf2(q2) = (1− αC)f1(q1) + αCf1(q2). (46)
Lemma 4 assumes that αC < 1. Then the mechanism can be understood as
having the user buy (1 − αC) fraction of the q1 contract to take advantage of
the large discount, and buys αC fraction of the q2 contract to take advantage
of his increased level of information.
Lemma 5. The user prefers to submit a rough estimation in period 1 and then
adjust it in period 2, rather than to ignore period 1 and only submit in period 2.
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Proof. We compare the user’s cost in both cases. If he only submits in period 2,
he would of course submit the true probability (in period 2). Thus his expected
cost is
c2 = p1w2(p21) + (1− p1)w2(p22)
= p1Cw1(p21) + (1− p1)Cw1(p22). (47)
If he submits in both periods, his expected payoff is
c12 = (1− αC)[pf1(p) + (1− p)g1(p)] + αc2
= (1− αC)w1(p) + αc2, (48)
where the first “=” is obtained by using the result of Lemma 4 to replace q1 by
p in Eq. (45).
We want to show that c12 < c2, so that the user wants to submit twice. It
can be found after some algebra that the condition is equivalent to having
p1w1(p21) + (1− p1)w1(p22)
w1(p)
>
δ − α
1− α
. (49)
If p21 = p22 the left hand side is 1, so the inequality is satisfied. If p21 6= p22,
then without loss of generosity we can assume that p21 < p22, and Eq. (49) can
be written as
p22 − p
p22 − p21
w1(p21)
w1(p)
+
p− p21
p22 − p21
w1(p22)
w1(p)
>
δ − α
1− α
, (50)
where p = p1p21 + (1 − p1)p22 ∈ [p21, p22]. Note that for fixed p, the left hand
side of Eq. (50) is increasing in p21 and decreasing in p22, so we can let p21 = 0
and p22 = 1 to obtain the stronger condition
w1(p)
p
<
1− α
δ − α
. (51)
If Eq. (51) holds for all p, then c12 < c2 for all (p1, p21, p22).
At this stage we take into account the specific form of w1(p):
w1(p) =
(
1 +
k
2
)
p−
k2
2
p2. (52)
We then have
w1(p)
p
= 1 +
k
2
−
k2
2
p ≤ 1 +
k
2
≤ C =
1
δ
<
1− α
δ − α
, (53)
where the second“≤” from the fact that k ∈ [1,min{2(C−1), 2}]. Hence Eq. (51)
indeed holds for all p, and c12 < c2. 
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Lemma 6. The coordinator makes profit when 0 < α < δ.
Proof. The coordinator expects to collect from the user
c12 = (1− αC)w1(p) + αC[p1w1(p21) + (1− p1)w1(p22)]
≥ (1− αC)p+ αC[p1p21 + (1 − p1)p22]
= (1− αC)p+ αCp = p, (54)
where we have used the fact w1(p) ≥ p for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Thus he expects to
collect ≥ p from each user who has probability p, so he makes profit. 
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